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Position paper:  
Phenomenological approaches and intersubjectivity 
Susan Gasson, College of Information Science & Technology, Drexel University 
Introduction 
An interpretive position understands the subjective meaning of social action (Burrell and 
Morgan, 1979).  Phenomenology examines the relationship between consciousness and being. 
From an epistemological standpoint, being is perceived as a correlate of conscious acts  
(Encyclopædia Britannica, 2002). As such, a phenomenological position rejects the “naturalist” 
worldview that is the consequence of modern natural scientific method (also referred to as 
objectivism or positivism). Burrell and Morgan reflect that the phenomenological movement is 
not altogether a coherent one. Husserl (1929) argued that reality could only be understood by 
interpreting an individual’s stream of consciousness in relation to that reality. Schutz (1932) 
developed this concept by emphasizing the importance of reflexivity: turning back upon oneself 
and examining what has been going on, in the context of the situation: 
“The fact that social action is meaningfully related to the behavior of others implies that 
the actor (since he is Other-oriented in his action) turns his attention to the subjective 
experiences of the Other in their constitutive structure.” (Schutz, 1932, page 148) 
Unlike Husserl, who argued that individuals could insert themselves into the Other’s stream of 
consciousness, Schutz argued that intersubjectivity required a “leap of consciousness” (Schutz, 
1967, quoted in Burrell and Morgan, 1979). This leap is developed further in Heidegger’s (1962) 
hermeneutic phenomenology, which takes the position that the interpretation of common 
experience leads to intersubjective understanding of the Other’s intention.  
The interpretivist stance in MIS owes a great deal to the development of theories of social 
construction in the design of technological artifacts (e.g. Berger and Luckman, 1966; Bijker et 
al., 1987; Latour, 1987; Mackenzie and Wajcman, 1985). While they often have slightly different 
philosophical underpinnings, these writings are strongly related by the central concept that 
intentionality can be interpreted through an analysis of physical and social artifacts (e.g. 
technology and/or documents and/or verbal statements). This position is an extension of the 
phenomenological position stated by Heidegger (1962) that intersubjectivity resides in our 
reflections on being-in-the-world and that all description is necessarily interpretation. An 
interpretivist position based upon hermeneutic phenomenology is concerned with the experiences 
of the individual (Other), the meanings and behaviors derived from these experiences and thus an 
understanding of the situated (in context) worldview of other individuals. Understanding may be 
obtained through a self-conscious interpretation of external artifacts such as texts, physical 
artifacts and social interactions (Gadamer, 1975). Which brings us back to interpretivism. 
Burrell and Morgan  (1979) suggest four elements of difference between interpretivism and the 
functionalist/objectivist position: 
1. The ontological debate: interpretivism takes a nominalist position, where phenomena are viewed as 
convenient concepts for the individual to make sense of the external world, while functionalism takes a 
realist position, where external phenomena exist independently of the individual’s perceptions. 
2. The epistemological debate: interpretivism takes an anti-positivist position, where understanding is seen as 
useful by talking the perspective of an ‘insider’ to the situation being observed. The insights generated are 
not seen as being universally applicable but of use to individuals in a similar situation. Each situation is 
viewed as essentially unique, but having subjectively-interpreted elements in common with other situations. 
Functionalism takes a positivist position that there are essential laws that relate to all aspects of existence, 
that these laws may be observed from outside the situation being observed and abstracted in sufficiently 
general terms to apply to a wide range of situations. 
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3. The debate concerning human nature: interpretivism takes the position that human beings have complete 
autonomy and that their actions are dictated by free will (which may be constrained by external forces), 
while functionalism takes the position that the behavior of individuals en masse (with exceptions that can 
be explained by a lack of rationality or variance from the mean) can be viewed as being determined by the 
external situation or environment. 
4. The methodological debate: interpretivism takes an ideographic position, that emphasizes subjective, 
insider accounts of situations, that can only be obtained by personal involvement in the situation. 
Functionalism takes a nomothetic position, attempting to derive (abstract) general, models or laws through 
the use of systematic protocol and technique to construct scientific tests regarding the nature of the “real 
world”. 
Hirschheim and Klein (1989) argue that the four paradigms of the Burrell and Morgan model 
overlap. This is true, especially as most “interpretive” researchers have been educated according 
to a positivist tradition that emphasizes the values of scientific truth and teaches falsification as 
an important element of logic. Yet understanding the differences outlined above can contribute 
greatly to any debate about the value of interpretivist research. When I first encountered 
grounded theory, I blindly assumed that, because Glaser and Strauss (1967) took a contingent 
approach to the collection of data, their proposed research method must be interpretivist in 
nature. Attending a seminar run by Barney Glaser soon disabused me of this notion: it was clear 
that the discourse related to models of the world that were “out there” in the “real” world1. The 
data collected were analyzed using statistical methods to derive universal laws of behavior. 
As an interpretivist researcher, I am aware that I hold a different worldview to many other 
researchers. My worldview sees “facts” as subjective and I am aware that the “real world” that I 
perceive, as a researcher, is different to the “real world” that the subjects in my research perceive 
and that my act of observation affects the behavior of the phenomena being observed. I am also 
aware that, far from being universally applicable, the findings of my research are inductively-
generated and are, at best interesting2 rather than universally applicable.  
We then run into the problem of generalizability. These problems do not affect the functionalist 
researcher, who is able to bound the research “problem”, in order to exclude elements of the 
situation which inconveniently differ (such as differences in the people involved, the task being 
undertaken, the external pressures on those involved, power differences between research 
“subjects”, the perceived legitimacy of actions, etc.). They can “design” a research study to 
selectively collect data on phenomena that they consider relevant to their bounded problem. The 
interpretivist researcher, on the other hand, must be aware that all phenomena in the situation 
being studied are relevant to the observed outcomes, that the outcomes and phenomena that they 
observe are selected according to inductive sensitization to such phenomena, and that they affect 
those very phenomena by their interaction with them. This leads the researcher to (a) question 
the fundamental value of research3, or (b) question everything. I believe that the latter position 
makes us become fundamentally better researchers. We need to continually assess what we are 
observing and why we are observing these phenomena (are we finding only what we are looking 
for and missing other, more valuable, insights?). We need to collect data obsessively, so that we 
can revisit it, when we realize that we have missed something critical. And we need an external 
“sounding-board”, someone who is sufficiently knowledgeable to understand what we are 
 
1 I was saved from self-immolation by a chance meeting during the break with Andy Lowe from Strathclyde who 
convinced me that the method could be applied in an interpretivist way by adapting the analysis of data and 
emphasizing the constant comparison element of the approach. 
2 I have Geoff Walsham to thank for this insight. I suspect that he may have made the point in his book: Walsham, 
G. (1993) Interpreting Information Systems In Organizations, John Wiley & Sons, Chichester, UK 
3 … which may lead them to get a ‘proper’ job instead (as one of my students phrased the issue) … 
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saying, yet not so associated with us or the problem that they cannot be somewhat objective in 
their critique of our reasoning4.  
Given my interpretivist position, I have been asked how I can believe that research is worth 
doing and that the data that I collect in this way contribute to knowledge in my field. I have to 
say that there are times when I have a certain sympathy with this perspective. However, I also 
believe that an understanding of this position gives the researcher a deeper insight into the 
validity and application of their research findings than is otherwise the case. We learn to “talk 
the talk” and “walk the walk” in a way that functionalist researchers, who are content with 
quantifying phenomena rather than trying to understand their nature, cannot do. This is how we 
achieve intersubjectivity with our subjects: we share their experience5. But there is a step after 
intersubjectivity which constitutes making the subjective objective again.  
Winograd and Flores (1986), after Heidegger (1962) talk about an object being present-at-hand – 
we understand the nature of their being – only when something goes wrong with its normal use. 
They distinguish this relationship with external objects with the ready-to-hand relationship that 
we normally enjoy, where the object is just a mediating tool for the task in hand. In interpretivist 
research, external phenomena – conceptual as well as physical – become present-at-hand for us. 
We question the nature of phenomena that we previously took for granted as part of our everyday 
existence. We interpret phenomena at many different levels in our everyday lives: we receive 
data subconsciously as well as consciously and we evaluate this data both objectively and 
subjectively. A phenomenological approach to research is at the core of interpretivism. It allows 
us to consciously make the implicit explicit. It allows us to question the very axioms of our 
existence. So the cycle of research is: 
a) Understanding the “problem situation” objectively and determining appropriate situations 
in which phenomena relevant to the research problem can be observed. 
b) Engaging in those situations intersubjectively with actors who regularly participate in 
such situations, to obsessively collect data on all phenomena that we can – whether or not 
they seem significant at the time of data collection. (See footnote 5). 
c) Disengaging from the situation at relevant points, to analyze the data, to question which 
phenomena are significant (from a pattern-recognition and utility6 perspective, rather 
than a frequency or quantity perspective), then reengaging if data saturation has not been 
achieved. Disengagement also requires regular, objective questioning of the value-
systems and assumptions that we bring to interpretation of the situation. 
d) Disengaging from the situation, to present the subjective as objective and to interpret the 
situation for others. 
One of the wonderful things about performing research within the discipline of information 
systems is that we can borrow from many different established areas of theory. But this also 
presents a clear and present danger. As we have not “grown up” in these disciplines, IS 
researchers often lack the inductive experience of what constitutes an appropriate level of 
analysis. One example is the use of the “mental model” or “cognitive frame” concept, to refer to 
everything from an intent to take a specific action, to a preprogrammed mental script for action. 
Phenomenology is an example of where we must be especially careful, as it is very easy to base 
 
4 As an interpretivist researcher, I have to say somewhat, rather than completely objective! 
5  Either vicariously, through stimulating multiple scenarios in case study research, or better, directly by engaging in 
participant observation. 
6 I use the word “utility” based on the classical Utilitarianism perspective (c.f. the works of Jeremy Bentham and 
John Stuart Mill). The use of this word is not an unintentional slip into functionalism! 
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wide-ranging conclusions on a very loosely-observed set of phenomena and not to question the 
assumptions that underlie our  research observations. In our everyday experience, we bound the 
scope of the phenomena that we consider useful and therefore monitor. For example, as an 
instructor, I have learned to filter out the glazed expression that a class of Undergraduates 
students gets whenever they are asked a question. However, as a sociologist, I would consider 
this a critical indicator of their internal experience as students. Similarly, as a researcher, it is too 
easy to filter out phenomena that do not fit with our expected model of behavior and then justify 
our findings in the light of theoretical groundedness. To have a research paper published, one 
must justify its findings in the light of existing theory. Yet to achieve radical advances in 
theoretical thinking - to make a paradigm leap - one must often fundamentally dispute, or ignore 
established bodies of theory (Kuhn, 1970). So we have a conflict between the explicit aims of 
research, to contribute to knowledge, and the implicit aims of research, to have papers accepted 
for publication7. In accepting the aim of career advancement (or even maintaining a career), we 
are imposing limitations on research that constrain the scope of the phenomena that we observe. 
I am an evangelist for rigorous grounded theory research. Yet even the use of the adjective 
rigorous is problematic in an interpretivist worldview, as it has so much baggage of 
functionalism and positivism attached to it. However, I believe that we can combine subjectivity 
and objectivity in a particular way, to be systematic in the analysis of data, but to permit an 
absence of systematic protocols for data collection and interpretation. It is permissible to allow 
inductive recognitions and patterns to emerge from the data, if we constantly question our own 
value-systems and assumptions as we do so. 
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